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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah

ROBERT H. CHRIST and JACK L.
WILLIAMS, d/b/a OAK HILL
SCHOOL
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
12,558

-vs-

MAPLETON CITY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah, and
PAUL CHERRINGTON,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Respondents on a Petition, first, against MAPLETON CITY, and then, on
amended Petition, against PAUL CHERRINGTON,
the Mapleton City Building Inspector and Zoning
Administrator, for a Writ of Mandamus to compel
the Appellants to issue a building permit for alteration of a "single-family" dwelling as a purported
school for boys, and upon the counterclaim of the
1

I

Appellant, MAPLETON CITY, for an injunction
against the Respondents enjoining and restraining
them from converting, reconstructing, altering, occupying, and using a "single-family" dwelling in
Mapleton City as a "multi-family" residence, dormitory, rooming house, boarding house, foster-family
care home, detention facility or pretended school. ·
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The District Court, on June 10, 1971, after a brief
and summary hearing on an Order to Show Cause 1
why the Writ should not issue, signed Findings of
Fact and Judgment and Writ of Mandamus ordering
the Building Inspector and Zoning Administrator of
Mapleton City to issue and deliver to the Respondents the building permit applied for. No action was 1
taken by the Court on the Appellants' counterclaim
for an injunction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial
court reversed and the Writ of Mandamus quashed.
Appellants further seek an order, pursuant to Titles
10-9-16 and 10-9-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requiring the lower court to issue an injunction and
restraining order against the Respondents, ordering
them to refrain from altering, building, or occupying
2

1

the structure in question without a building permit
and Certificate of Zoning Compliance therefor, in
accord with the demand of the counterclaim of the
Appellants and the provisions of the zoning law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of the summary nature of the proceedings in this case, the transcript of the record is brief.
The essential facts upon which the trial court predicated its decision to order the issuance of a Writ of
Mandamus are these:
On December 23, 1970, a co-partnership doing
business under the assumed name of "OAK HILL
SCHOOL" (Respondents' Amended Answer to Request for Admissions Number 1) filed a written application with Mapleton City for a permit to remodel the Irwin Bailie "single-family" dwelling in
the A-2 Zone of Mapleton City. The application
(Appellants' Exhibit 2) described the contemplated
use of the building, after remodeling, as a "private
school for boys." The plans and specifications, however, prepared by or at the instance of the Respondents and submitted with and forming a part of the
application, described and projected extensive alterations in the character of the existing "singlefamily" structure to create two offices, one T. V.
lounge, one kitchen, one dining room, six bedrooms
3

and closets to accommodate twenty-six boys, six
bathrooms, one room for staff quarters, two rooms
for storage and laundry, one recreation room, one
room for crafts, and one classroom. (Appellants'
Exhibit 2; Respondents' Amended Answer to Request for Admissions Number 4; R-8).
On December 28, 1970, Respondents presented
their application to the Zoning Administrator and
Planning Commission of Mapleton City, and at the
conclusion of a hearing thereon, the Respondents \
were informed that the Zoning Administrator and
Planning Commission were going to recommend to
the City Council that the permit not be granted. On
January 4, 1971, Respondents appeared before the
Mapleton City Council and requested approval of
1
their application. The matter was taken under advisement and the City Council immediately thereafter sustained the action of the Zoning Administrator and Planning Commission in denying Respondents' application.

The Respondents then appealed the decision of
the Zoning Administrator and Planning Commission to and applied for an interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance by the Mapleton City Board of Ad- ,
justment as provided by the Ordinance. (Chapter
4-3(a), 6, 7, 8 Mapleton City Zoning Ordinance) The
4

Board of Adjustment, on January 12, 1971, after a
hearing thereon, sustained the action of the Zoning
Administrator and Planning Commission in denying Respondents' application for the building permit
and interpreted the Zoning Ordinance as not permitting a "multi-family" dwelling and dormitorytype facility in the A-2 Zone. (R-3)

It should be noted that notwithstanding the fact
that Appellants denied Respondents' application for
the building permit and that that action was affirmed by the Board of Adjustment on appeal, and
that no permit has, in fact, ever issued to Respondents, either for the alteration of and construction
in the Bailie home or for any use or occupancy thereof different from a "single-family" dwelling, the
Respondents, in open defiance of the City, have,
nevertheless, proceeded to alter the Bailie home in
the manner specified in their application (R-11),
and to solicit patrons therefor (R-9) and to occupy
and operate the same (R-12).
It should also be noted that at the time the application for permit was filed and this action was
commenced by the Respondents, they were a co-partnershi p doing business under the assumed name of
"Oak Hill School" and had not filed an affidavit of
5

assumed and true name with the Office of the Secretary of State as required by the provisions of Title
42-2-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. (Respondents' Amended Answers to Request for Admissions Numbers 1 and 2)
It is important, also, to observe that there was
in operation, prior to the enactment of the Zoning
Ordinance, a similar facility known as the "Ettie

Lee Home for Boys," which continues to function in
the same A-2 Zone on a non-conforming use basis.
This facility is contiguous to the Bailie property
and located about one-fourth to one-half mile distant from the Bailie home. (Appellants' Fifth Affirmative Defense-Uncontroverted; R-15, 16)

I

The Respondents' Amended Petition was heard
on an Ex-parte Order to Show Cause why a Writ of
Mandamus should not issue, as part of a full calendar on a regular law and motion day, and it is clearly
evident from the record that the court did not have ,
the time and was not disposed to consider the case
and all its ramifications in the depth which the
merits of the case demanded. The court required that
the matter be submitted on written briefs, without
oral argument, and, further, required the Appellants
to file the initial memorandum and to sustain the
burden of showing why the permit should not issue to
6

the Respondents. (R-20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28)
The record is clear that the structural changes
in the Bailie "single-family" dwelling contemplated
by the Respondents' application were designed and
intended to create a "multi-family," foster-family
care home, dormitory-type facility for the housing
of twenty-six (26) juvenile boys having drug, emo-tional, and other problems, and to provide for their
full-time, day and night living, sleeping, and eating
accommodations. (R-'i, 8, 9)
The property on which the building permit is
sought is located in Zone A-2 of the Zoning Ordinances of Mapleton City. (Appellants' Answer Number 16 to Respondents' Request for Admissions) The
ordinance, in general terms, permits "one-family''
dwellings and schools, public parks and playgrounds
in the A-2 Zone. The ordinance further provides for
and authorizes "multi-family'' dwellings, nursing
homes, foster-family care homes, and orphanages in
Zone R-3, subject to the approval of the Board of
Adjustment. (Respondents' Exhibit 1)
The facts will be further alluded to in Appellants'
argument.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I
7

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE WRIT
OF MANDAMUS COMPELLING THE APPEL.
LANTS TO ISSUE THE BUILDING PERMIT.

II
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE AP.
PELLANTS TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT
THE PERMIT SHOULD BE GRANTED.

III
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER AND GRANT APPELLANTS' APPLICA·
TION FOR AN INJUNCTION AND RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE WRIT
OF MANDAMUS COMPELLING THE APPEL·
LANTS TO ISSUE THE BUILDING PERMIT.

The critical question to be decided on this appeal
is whether or not, under the circumstances of this
case, Mapleton City and its officers and boards,
charged with the administration of its zoning ordinances, can be properly compelled, in a summary pro·
ceeding, by the peremptory Writ of Mandamus, to
8

issue a building permit for what is denominated in
the application of the Respondents as a "private
school for boys," but which, in fact, according to the
plans and other information and data submitted with
and as a part of the application (Appellants' Exhibit 2), calls for the remodeling, construction, and
conversion of a "single-family" dwelling into a
"multi-family," multi-person dwelling, foster-family
care home, or residential detention facility, with only
incidental use contemplated as a school, and which is
so interpreted by the various officers and boards
charged with the administration of the zoning law.
Section 1-2 of the ordinance defines the purposes of
the same as: "to promote the health, safety, morals,
convenience, order, prosperity, and general welfare
of the present and future inhabitants of the City of
Mapleton, Utah." Section 1-4 of the ordinance provides:

"It is the intent of the City Council of
Mapleton City, Utah, that the regulations and
restrictions as set forth in this ordinance shall
be so interpreted and construed as to further
the objectives and purposes of this ordinance."
(a) THE OFFICE AND PURPOSE OF MANDAMUS IS TO COMPEL LAWFUL ACTION, BUT
NOT TO DICTATE OR CONTROL THE CITY OR
BOARDS' DECISION.
9

A public officer is in duty bound to exercise tht
judgment or discretion which is reposed in him
law. If he fails or refuses to do so, and does not atl
upon the subject or pass upon the question on whicn
said judgment or discretion is to be exercised, then
the Writ of Mandamus may be used to enforce obedience to the law. In other words, when, in matters
involving discretion, the Respondent refuses to act
at all, mandamus may issue to move him to action
and to exercise his discretion in the matter.
(SMYTH vs. BUTTERS, 38 Utah 151, 112 Pac. 809)
The applicant for the writ, in such case, merely asks
that the officer or board make a decision one way or
the other. He does not seek to use the writ to compel or control the decision in any particular way, for,
this cannot be done. ( 52 Am. J ur. 2nd 398 Section 77)
"Although, as has been seen, mandamus
may be resorted to for the purpose of compelling the exercise of official discretion, the use
of the writ will not ordinarily be extended so
as to interfere with the manner in which the
discretion is exercised or to influence or coerce
a particular determination. (Citing McCARTEN vs. SANDERSON, 111 Montana 407, 409
Pac. 2nd 1108, 132 ALR 1229) It has been reiterated that in the absence of a capricious or
arbitrary act, mandamus will not issue to con10

trol the exercise of official discretion or to
alter or review action taken in the proper exercise of such discretion or judgment." (Citing SMYTH vs. BUTTERS, 38 Utah 151, 112
Pac. 809)
"Thus, mandamus will not lie to control
the discretion of the court or judicial officer, or
to compel its exercise in a particular manner,
except in those rare instances when under the
facts it can be legally exercised in but one way,
nor is it a proper remedy to control acts of
governmental bodies when acting within the
scope of their legal powers. (52 Am. Jur. 2nd
298, et. seq., citing GOODMAN vs. MEADE,
162 Pa. supra 587, 60 A. 2nd 577) Mandamus
is not an instrument for the instruction of public officers as to the manner in which they
shall discharge duties which call for the exercise of discretion, as distinguished from the
performance of ministerial duties." (Citing
WOLFE vs. YOUNG, Texas Civil Appeals 277
S. W. 2nd 744)
"Mandamus is used to stimulate action
pursuant to some legal duty, and is not ta
cause the Respondents to undo action already
taken, or to correct or review such action, however erroneous it mau have been." (ST ATE ex
rel. ROBINSON vR. HUTCHESON. 180 Ten11

nessee 46, 171 S. W. 2nd, 282, 186 ALR 850)
"Mandamus is not a substitute for, and
cannot be resorted to in civil proceedings to
serve the purpose of certiorari, appeal, or writ
of error, and this is true even though there is
no mode of review given by or available under
the law ... " (52 Am. Jur. 2nd 337, Section 9)
"When there is no other adequate remedy,
mandamus will issue to enforce performance of
plain and imperative duties of administerial
character imposed by law upon administrative
bodies. The writ will not issue to control judgment or discretion. Unless there has been a
'clear abuse of discretion,' or the action of the
agency was arbitrary, capricious, or prompted
by wrongful motives, where judgment or discretion is reposed in an administrative agency
and has, by that agency, been exercised, courts
are powerless to use the writ of mandamus to
compel a different conclusion." (U. S. ex rel.
CHICAGO G. W. R. COMP ANY vs. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 294
U. S. 50)
The foregoing principles of law prevail in the
State of Utah. In the case of TUTTLE vs. BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 77 Utah
270, 285; 294 Pac. 294, this court said that mandate
does not lie unless the relator or petitioner shows a
clear legal dght to performance of the act demanded
12

and a plain duty of the officer, board or tribunal to
perform it as demanded, and where the duty to perform the act is doubtful, or where a discretion is imposed or involved in the performance of it, mandate
ordinarily will not compel the performance of it in
a particular way.
"Writ of mandamus may be used to compel
an inferior tribunal to act on a matter within
its jurisdiction, but not to control its discretion while acting, nor to reverse its judgment
when made." (HATHAWAY vs. McCONKIE,
85 Utah 21, 38 Pac. 2nd 300)
"Mandamus will not lie to compel a board
or officer having quasi-judicial function, to
reverse or review judgment arrived at in discharging function, but will issue to such board
or officer only if it or he refuses to exercise
function." (CIVIC FEDERATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY vs. SALT LAKE COUNTY, 22
U 6; 61 Pac. 222)
"Actfon of public officer in situation calling for exercise of discretion is not reviewable
by mandamus unless such officer has been
guilty of clear and willful disregard of duty,
or acts with caprice or partiality." (STATE
ex rel. BISHOP vs. MOREHOUSE, 38 Utah
234; 112 Pac. 169)
(b) THE ZONING ADMINISTRATOR, THE

13

PLANNING COMMISSION, AND THE BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT ARE EMPOWERED TO AND
CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
INTERPRETING AND APPL YING THE ZONING LAW, AND IN THAT BEHALF, ARE EMPOWERED AND REQUIRED TO EXERCISE
LAWFUL JUDGMENT AND DISCRETION IN
THE ISSUANCE OF BUILDING PERMITS.
Under Section 4-3 of the Zoning Ordinance, it is
provided:
"The Board of Adjustment shall have the
following powers and duties:
a. Interpret ordinance and map.

The Board of Adjustment shall hear and
decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or refusal made in the
enforcement of this ordinance. The Board of
Adjustment shall also interpret the zone map
and boundaries thereof in case of dispute or
disagreement."
Section 5-3( 4) of the Ordinance further provides
that:
"Where other uncertainty exists, the Board
of Adjustment shall interpret the map."
In distinguishing between ministerial duties and
duties involving judgment or discretion, the general

14

1
1
1

rule is that in matters involving the interpretation
of a statute, the officer or board acts with judgment
and discretion.
"A duty or act is ministerial in the sense
here intended when there is no room for the
exercise of discretion, official or otherwise,
the performance being required by direct and
positive command of the law ... But a duty is
regarded as involving the character of judgment or discretion, and cannot be controlled
by mandamus, where it is not thus plainly
prescribed or depends upon a statute or statutes, the construction or application of which
is not free from doubt ... Where the duty is
not plainly prescribed, but is to be gathered
by doubtful inference from a statute or statutes of uncertain meaning, it is to be regarded
as involving the character of judgment or discretion which may not be controlled by mandamus, even though the court may deem the
conclusion reached to be erroneous ... " (52
Am. J ur. 2nd 402, Sections 80, 81 and 82)
The issuance of licenses or permits by boards and
officers charged with that responsibility is a discretionary function.
"Boards and officers charged with the duty
or power of issuing licenses and permits usually exercise a discretionary function in the
matter. Their determination involves a judg-

15

ment as to the right and fitness of the applicant and generally calls for examining evidence and passing upon questions of fact.
Where such is the case, courts may compel
them to exercise their judgment or discretion,
but will not attempt to control their discretion or compel them by mandamus to decide
in a particular way. If in the proper exercise
of their power they refuse a license or permit,
the writ will not issue to revise or review their
decision." (Anno: 20 ALR 1482; 29 ALR 41,
42, 53 ALR 49; 153; 72 ALR 1339; 124 ALR
247, 249)
The foregoing rule which accords to officers and
boards a status of judgment and discretion in the
exercise of their powers in issuing permits and interpreting ordinances is adhered to by the courts of
this state.
In NAYLOR vs. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 17 Utah 2nd 300, 410 Pac. 2nd 764, this court
said:
"The (zoning) commission, being charged
with the duty of carrying out these numerous
and varied objectives, must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude of discretion as to the
manner in which they can best be obtained.
In conformity with well-established rules relating to the powers of administrative bodies,
it is to be assumed that they have some spe-

16
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II

\

1

cialized know ledge of the conditions and the
needs upon which the discharge of their duties
depends. Because the law imposes this duty
primarily upon the (zoning) commission, and
because of its presumed expertise in fulfilling that responsibility, the court will 11-0t invade the province of the commission and substitute its judgment therefor; nor will it
interfere with the prerogatives of the commission unless it is shown to be so clearly in error that there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action must therefore
be regarded as capricious and arbitrary." (See
also GAYLORD vs. SALT LAKE COUNTY,
11 Utah 2nd 307; 358 Pac. 2nd 633)
The meaning of the terms "arbitrary and capricious" in connection with municipal zoning was succinctly set forth by the court in JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES vs. MULLEN, 214 Oregon 281; 330 Pac.
2nd 5, as follows:
"The terms 'arbitrary and capricious action' when used in connection with determining the validity of action of municipal zoning
authorities means willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of
facts and circumstances of the case, and where
there is room for two opinions, the action is
not arbitrary or capricious if exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even tlwugh
17

it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached."
No matter whether the court may consider the
decision of the zoning administrator, the planning commission, and the board of adjustment to
refuse to issue a building permit to the Respondents
upon the basis of their application, including the
plans and other information and data forming a
part thereof, as wise or improper, the action taken
is within the scope of the powers and the judgment
and discretion vested in this officer and these boards
in interpreting and applying the zoning law and the
court cannot properly un-do what has been done or
dictate a different course of action by the mandamus
writ. Certainly there is no basis for any claim that
the action taken was arbitrary or capricious within
the definition of those terms herein set out and generally applied.

"It is primarily the duty of the city to
make the classifications. If the classification
is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of the
court will not be substituted for the judgment
of the city." (MARSHALL vs. SALT LAKE
CITY, 105 U 111; 141 Pac. 2nd 704, 709; 142
ALR 282)
(c) THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CLEAR
AND ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO A BUILDING PERMIT AND THERE IS NO CLEAR OR AB SOL UTE
DUTY ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANTS
18
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TO ISSUE THE SAME UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
The mere fact that the Respondents have applied
for a building permit to remodel a "single-family"
dwelling ostensibly as a "school" is not controlling
and does not create an absolute right to a permit
when, as in this case, the accompanying plans and
other information and data submitted to the city
clearly demonstrate that the proposed structural
changes are designed and intended to create a "multifamily," "multi-person" facility in the nature of a
foster-family care home designed to provide living
accommodations for more than a single family. It is
the character of the facility which controls rather
than the name which is appended to it in the application.
"The name by which an institution is designated or called is not of controlling importance in determining whether or not it is a
permissible use under a zoning ordinance; the
question is to be determined by the activities
or character of the business or service carried on, and not by the name." (CRAIN vs.
LOUISVILLE, 1944, 298 Ky. 421; 182 S. W.
2nd 787; 64 ALR 2nd 1168)
"The law must not only autlwrize the act
sought to be enforced, but must require it to
be done . . . Doubtful rights cannot be protected by mandamus, and it follows, as a corol19

lary, that the writ generally will not issue to
enforce doubtful duties ... (52 Am. Jur, 2nd
395, Section 73)
·
Neither is it necessary for the Appellants to wait
until the facility is occupied before determining that
the use of the facility is in violation of the application ,where the application itself and the plans submitted show, on their face, a design and intent to convert a "single-family" dwelling into a "multifamily," "multi-person" dwelling irrespective of any
other or additional use contemplated. The provision
in the ordinance for a certificate of compliance is primarily addressed to that situation in which an unlawful use of a facility is made where no building
permit may even be involved or required. Here, the
conversion of a "single-family" dwelHng into a
"multi-person," multi-family dwelling, for school
purposes or otherewise, is violative of the use restrictions and spirit and purpose of the A-2 Zone.
"A city may lawfully require that an individual shall obtain a permit for the construction or use of a building." (YUBA CITY vs.
CHERNIA VSKY, 117 Ca 568; 4 Pac. 2nd 299)
Section 8-2 of the Mapleton City Ordinances provides that:
"No building or structure shall be constructed, reconstructed, altered, or moved,
nor shall the use of any land be changed except after the issuance of a permit for the
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same by the zoning administrator or other
authorized officer."
Section 8-3 of the Ordinances further provides
that:
" ... Permits shall not be granted for the
construction or alteration of any building or
structure or for the moving of a building or
structure onto a lot or for the change in use of
any land, building, or structure, if such construction, alteration, moving, or change in use
would be a violation of any of the provisions
of this ordinance, nor shall any sewer service
line, water service line, or electric utilities be
installed to serve such premises if such use
would be in violation of this ordinance."

It is obvious that there is no obligation or duty on
the part of the City to defer its refusal to issue a
building permit under the circumstances nor to refrain from taking any action against the Respondents until after the facility is remodeled and occupied. The City, would, in fact, be remiss in its duty
to its citizens and inhabitants if it were to defer
such enforcement and permit outlays of cash and
effort by the applicant when the intent of the applicant is already known and expressed and the plans
clearly show that the facility is designed to create
a "multi-family," multi-person dwelling for day and
night living in a "single-family" dwelling zone, irrespective of any other or additional uses to which the
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property may be put, and when, as here, the applicants have proceeded without written permit to remodel and occupy the structure, and have at no time
applied for or received a certificate of zoning compliance as required by Section 8-7 of the Zoning Ordinance. The requirement of a certificate of compliance with the ordinance as a condition precedent to
use and occupancy of a property or facility is an additional and not a substituted requirement under the
ordinances. The Writ of Mandamus, in any event,
should issue only if it will resolve the entire problem.
" ... The writ is not an appropriate remedy
unless it will settle the entire controversy."
(LAKELAND JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT
vs. SCHOOL DISTRICT, 414 Pac. 451; 200 A.
2nd 748; 52 Am. Jur. 2nd 360, Section 36)
"Mandamus is never granted in a doubtful
case." (SNYDER vs. EMERSON, 19 Utah 319,
57 Pac. 300)
"In mandamus proceeding, the legal right
to require a person or court to proceed and the
legal duty to do so must be free from doubt."
(HOFF1MAN vs. LEWIS, 31 Utah 179, 87 Pac.
167)
"To warrant the court in granting a writ
of mandamus against a public officer, such
state of facts must be presented as to show
that the relator has clear right to performance
22

of thing demanded, and that corresponding
duty rests upon the officer to perform the particular thing." (STATE vs. MOREHOUSE,
38 Utah 234, 112 Pac. 169)
"Where public officers are sought to be
coerced by will of mandate to do certain acts,
the right of plaintiff to have act performed
must be clear, and corresponding duty upon
officer to do required act must be correspondingly clear." (WOODCOCK vs. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 55
Utah 458, 187 Pac. 181, 10 ALR 181)
"Owing to the summary and drastic character of the writ of mandamus, the law properly has erected around it many safeguards
... In issuing the writ, regard should be had
for the exigency which calls for the exercise
of the court's discretion, and the interests of
the public ... and the promotion of substantial justice. The writ will not issue in doubtful
cases, but only where there is a clear right in
the plaintiff or relator to relief sought, a corresponding clear duty to be performed by the
respondent, and no other specific and adequate mode of relief is available to the complaining- party .. "(52 Am. Jur. 2nd 356, Section 31)
"Where, as to the facts, there exists any
admissible doubt or where reasonable men
23

might conscientiously differ with respect to
discretion or the absence thereof, the courts

have with practical unanimity declined to interfere by mandamus, and whenever an element of discretion enters into the duty to be
performed, the functions of mandatory authority are short of their customary potency
and become powerless to dictate terms to that
discretion. The court is without power to substitute its discretion for that of a public officer or body or, where the act is discretionary, to direct that it be performed in a specific
manner." (BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS vs. PRICE, Okla. 385 Pac. 2nd 479;
52 Am. J ur. 2nd 399, Section 78)
" ... The court will not interfere by mandamus to compel the issuance of a building permit where the refusal of permit is not arbitrary and void, but involves the determination by the city officials upon facts as to which
there is some admissible doubt or in respect of
which reasonable men might conscientiously
differ." (JACKSON vs. McPHERSON, 158
Miss. 152, 130 S. 0. 287)
( d) IN INTERPRETING THE ZONING ORD IN AN CE, THE ORDINANCE MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND PROPER EFFECT
MUST BE GIVEN TO THE ENTIRE PURPOSE
A ND SPil?IT OF THE SAME.
24

"In determining the meaning of a city zoning ordinance and in construing the ordinance,
the court does not isolate one part of the ordinance and ignore the plain import and
meaning of the other parts, but gives force
and effect to all of the provisions germain
to the subject involved." (KILKOYNE vs.
CITY OF COFFEYVILLE, 176 Kansas 159;
269 Pac. 2nd 418.)
"In determining the sense in which a particular word was used in a zoning ordinance,
the court would consider the word in relation
to the context of the entire ordinance." (CITY
OF TULSA vs. MIZEL, Okla. 265 Pac. 2nd
496)
"The segregation in zoning ordinances of
certain types of uses and businesses for certain areas is not a legislative sanction to carry
on in such areas a business not expressly excluded therefrom, if there are reasons, apart
from the zoning law, why the particular business may not be legally carried on in that
area." (PRIMM vs. CITY OF RENO, 70 Nevada 7; 252 Pac. 2nd 835)
On this point, the Utah court has expressed itself
as follows:
"The character of a zoning district, as a
whole, must be kept in mind in determining
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whether the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the district and hence of the commun ty, would be promoted ... " (DOWSE vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, 123 Utah 107; 255 Pac.
2nd 723)
Ordinary day-time schools are manifestly compatible with "one-family" dwellings, public parks,
and playgrounds, but the same cannot be said of a
residential detention-type facility operated under
the guise of a "school". As noted herein, Zone R-3
authorizes multi-family dwellings, nursing homes,
foster-family care homes, and orphanages,subject to
the approval of the board of adjustment, which facilities are manifestly more akin to the facility proposed
by the Respondents than is a "school" and it should
also be observed that in the definition of terms set
out in the ordinance (Section 3-1), those facilities
which contemplate the housing of children for a
limited purpose on a day-time only basis are differentiated from those facilities which provide for over·
night lodging and living accommodations; and those
uses which contemplate employing a facility for the
over-night lodging and living accommodation of
such children are restricted to the R-3 Zone which
also authorizes "multi-family" and multi-person
dwellings, and requires the approval of the Board of
Adjustment. It is obvious from these distinctions
that it was never contemplated that a school should
include a faciUty primarily designed to provide liv·
ing accommodations on a day and night basis with
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only a limited school use. If school were the primary
function of this facility, public schools are available
and would be utilized. Obviously, the primary function of the facility is not "school" in the accepted
sense of that term. To interpret the ordinance
otherwise would be to say that because the State Industrial School contains the word "school" in its
name, it could be established in any zone of any city
designated generally as permitting a "school". By
the same token, the fact that the State Prison conducts classes and grants certificates of graduation
or diplomas to its inmates qualifies it as a "school"
in the broadest definition, but it cannot seriously be
contended that it would be proper or appropriate to
establish a State Prison in any zone authorizing,
generally, a use for "school" purposes.
The primary and paramount purpose of the facility must be determined, and if the use contemplated
and for which the structural changes are designed
are fundamentally to provide residential accommodations with only incidental use as a "school", the
judgment of the zoning administrator, the planning commissfon, and the Board of Adjustment is
the proper foundation for any decision relative thereto rather than the substituted judgment of the court.
In applying the rules of interpretation hereinabove set out in numerous decisions of the courts, it is
clear that to allow a "foster-family care home,"
whether called a "school" or by whatever name it is
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designated, to be established in a zone restricted to
"single-family" dwellings, schools, parks, and playgrounds, would defeat the entire purpose and spirit
of
zone. In fact, to permit this type of facility,
designed for the care and treatment of disturbed and
delinquent juvenile boys-some with "drug" problems-would have the practical effect of eliminating
normal day-time "schools," parks, and playgrounds
from the area altogether, because such facilities
could not be established or utilized near facilities for
juvenile delinquent boys-especially two such facilities-without inordinate risk and danger to the
young people desiring to use the same.
In a case somewhat similar, decided by this court,
and involving Provo City, this court interpreted the
meaning of the term "semi-public building" just as,
in this case, the zoning administrator, the planning commission, and the board of adjustment were
required to interpret the meaning of the word
"school" under the particular circumstances of this
case. In PROVO CITY vs. CLAUDIN, 91 Utah 60,
63 Pac. 2nd 570, the court held that an ordinance
prohibiting the use of a building in a residential
district for other than certain specified purposes,
which included "public and semi-public buildings"
excluded a "funeral home" even though that facility
had some of the attributes of a "semi-public" building.
In particular instances, the courts have distinguished between the meaning of certain terms as ap28

plied to various and particular fact situations:
In APPLICATION OF DEVEREAUX FOUNDATION (1945), 351 Pa. 478; 41 A2nd 744; appeal
dismissed, 326 U. S. 686, the court held that an application by a school devoted to the education of mentally deficient, weak, and abnormal children, to erect
a dormitory for boys of such school should have been
denied, and no variance allowing such structure
should have been granted, on the ground that such
proposed structure did not fall within the terms of
the zoning ordinance which provided that a building
might be used for "educational or religious use, including a dormitory of an educational institution,"
since it was actually a "structure or other place for
accommodating persons mentally deficient, weak, or
abnormal," and that the granting of a variance to
the ordinance would be contrary to the public interest because of its effect on the adjoining residential pronerty owners.
Again, in YONKERS vs. HOROWITZ, 226 NYS
252, 22 APP. Div. 297, the court held that the operation of a home providing food, lodging and care and
control of from 20 to 25 children aged 7 to 14 or 15
years, who had been placed there by their parents,
was a violation of a zoning ordinance which permitted the operation of a "lodging or boarding house,"
as well as schools, libraries or public museums. (See
64 ALR 2nd 1170 and 134 ALR 1011.)
It should be noted that in the last case cited above,
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the zone in question in fact authorized lodging or
boarding houses as well as "schools" whereas in the
case before this court, lodging or boarding houses
are not permitted and over-night occupancy is restricted to "single-family" dwellings.
The cases are replete with instances where zoning administrators, planning commissions, and
boards of adjustment have been called upon to interpret the meaning of particular terms as applied to
particular fact situations and the judgment of these
officers and boards has not been overturned by the
courts through mandamus.

1

"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
which is available only in cases in which the
usual forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. Courts proceed with great caution
in granting the writ ... It is available only in
rare cases, as a last resort for causes that are
really extraordinary." (52 Am. Jur. 2nd 334,
Section 5)

Under the Ordinances of Mapleton City as authorized by state law, the Board of Adjustment is empowered to interpret the ordinances and the meaning '
thereof and has proceeded to do so in this case and
its judgment cannot properly be reversed by writ
of mandamus issuing from the court.
The court, in its memorandum decision, has
cited as authority for its position, the case of WILT30

WYCK SCHOOL FOR BOYS, INC. vs. HILL, et al.
(182 NE 2nd 268, 11 NY 2nd 182) It is submitted that
this case is not controlling or applicable, on its facts,
to the fact situation now before this court. First of
all WILTWYCK was a non-profit corporation and
its certificate of incorporation was consented to by
the Commissioner of Education of the State of New
York and by the State Board of Social Welfare, pursuant to law. Its purposes, as set forth in its Certificate of Incorporation were: "to administer for dependent, neglected, abandoned, destitute, delinquent, and emotionally disturbed children, without
discrimination as to race or color, a constructive
program of moral and spiritual enlightenment,
character development, correctional behavior problems, education and training for good citizenship;
and as part of the foregoing program, to conduct a
home for such children ... " The patrons of the
school were children from eight to twelve years of
age all residents of New York City. Half of the
school's budget was paid by New York City and half
of that amount was reimbursed to the City by New
York State. The Board of Education maintained on
the school premises "Public Schoool No. 615, Manhattan." Teachers were paid by the New York Board of
Education and the New York City curriculum was
applied. Children attended classes from 9 o'clock to 3
o'clock p.m. with an hour for lunch and were referred
to the school on a screening basis. By law. the school
was not permitted to take "psychotic" children and
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the school maintained a staff of 113 people, excluding the public school teachers. The court said:
"There can be no doubt that the evidence
showed that Wiltwyck, in conjunction with the
Board of Education of the City of New York,
was carrying on its work and function for the
state."

The critical factor which differentiates this case
from the case at bar, however, is that under the Yorktown Zoning Ordinance, governing the case, dormitories were expressly permitted as accessory buildings. In effect, therefore, the situation presented
was that of a public school with daytime hours of
instruction and a state supported dormitory in connection therewith, which dormitory was expressly
permitted by the zoning law. To the contrary, the
Oak Hill School at Mapleton in the case at bar, is not
publicly sanctioned, supervised, sponsored, or financed. It is a private, profit venture. The school ,
proposed is not a regular public school operated for
students resident in Mapleton City, only, and the
zone in question expressly limits day and night occupation to "single-family" dwellings and makes no
provision for dormitories and foster-family care type
facilities.
(e) THE ISSUANCE OF A BUILDING PERMIT FOR THE TYPE OF FACILITY CONTEMPLATED BY THE RESPONDENTS IS AGAINST
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONTRARY TO
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LAW.
There is presently in operation in the same A-2
Zone in Mapleton City and less than one-half mile
distant from the applicants' proposed facility, a foster-family care type home for delinquent boys
known as the "Ettie Lee Home" which was established prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance and
which exists on a non-conforming use basis. The
construction and operation of another home and
quasi-detention facility for juvenile and delinquent
boys in the immediate proximity of the subsisting
"Ettie Lee Home," no matter under what name it is
known, will cause and produce an undue concentration of delinquent and problem boys in a given area;
enhance and enlarge the necessity for increased police surveillance, patrol, and protection, in a small
community serviced by a single policeman and one
part-time assistant; and augment the present and
potential hazards to the general public and the lawful inhabitants of said area. All of these circumstances and conditions will tend toward breaches of
the public oeace and the issuance of a building permit for the facility sought by the Respondents will
be e:tnd js manifestly against the public interest.
"Mandamus is a writ designed to remedy a
wrong, not to promote one; it is designed to
comnel performance of a duty which ought to
be performed. not to direct an act which will
work a public injury, or a orivate mischief, or
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to compel a technical or literal compliance with
the strict letter of the law in disregard of its
spirit ... The Court . , may refuse to grant
the writ if the consequence of its issuance will
not promote substantial justice,will result in
more harm than good, ... will tend to disorder
and confusion, or will be attendant with manifest hardships and difficulties. If the evils following the issuance of the writ will outweigh
those sought to be corrected, the court may
refuse to grant it, even though the petitioner
may show a clear legal right for which mandamus is an appropriate remedy." (RILEY vs.
CARTER, 165 Okla. 262; 25 Pac. 2nd 666; 88
ALR 1018; 52 Am. J ur. 2nd 358, Section 33)

"It is an accepted doctrine that courts in the

exercise of their discretionary powers to issue
writs of mandamus will look to the public interests which may be concerned. Thus, even
though the re la tor shows a clear legal right
thereto, the court may properly refuse issuance
of the writ if public injury or embarrassment
may result therefrom, or if it will operate to
the detriment rather than to the benefit of the
general public, or if it will be likely to create
disorder and confusion in pub He affairs .... "
(52 Am. Jur. 2nd 359, Section 34)
(f) THE RESPONDENTS DO NOT APPLY TO
THE COURT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE
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FORM OF MANDAMUS WITH CLEAN HANDS
AND ARE, THEREFORE, BARRED FROM SUCH
RELIEF.
The facts of this case show (1) that the Respondents have proceeded to remodel and convert a "singlefamily" dwelling in the A-2 Zone of Mapleton City
to a multi-family," multi-person dwelling and fosterfamily care home without having first procured from
the city a building permit therefor, and have, further, proceeded to occupy and use said converted
facility without having procured a certificate of zoning compliance, both acts constituting a continuing misdemeanor under Sections 8-11 and 8-12 of the
Mapleton City Zoning Ordinance; and (2) the Respondents have represented in their brochures (Appellants' Exhibit 3) that they are a fully accredited
school, whereas, in truth and in fact, at the time of
such representations and at the present time, the
Respondents were not and are not qualified, licensed, and accredited as a school. Such action on the part
of the Respondents is fraudulent and deceptive and
the Respondents, having committed a continuing
misdemeanor, do not invoke the jurisdiction of the
court in this equitable proceeding with clean hands
and their application should be denied. (Vol. 3, Rathkopf-Law of Zoning and Planning, Ch. 68, Sect. 7)
" ... Whether mandamus should be denied
on equitable considerations should be determined from the facts of the particular case.
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Ordinarily, if injury, damage, or prejudice results therefrom, the writ is not available to
one who does not come into court with clean
hands, is ignorant of the facts, and has not
used reasonable diligence to inform himself
thereof, or who refuses to do equity, or who
has been guilty of fraud or bad faith with respect to the matter in controversy ... " (52 Am.
Jur 2nd 357, Section 32)
(g) THE RESPONDENTS HA VE A PLAIN,
SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW
AND ARE NOT, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO
THE EQUITABLE WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Chapter 4, Section 9, of the Mapleton City Ordinances pertaining to zoning provides:
"Any person aggrieved by any decision of
the Board of Adjustment may have and maintain a pl,enary action for relief therefrom in
any court of competent jurisdiction, provided
that petition for such relief is presented to the
court within 30 days after the filing of such
decision in the office of the Board of Adjustment."
Webster and Black and the American Heritage
Dictionary all define "plenary" as "full; absolute;
complete in all aspects or essentials." Certainly, the
term as thus defined does not refer to a summary proceeding. There can be no question that the petition
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for a Writ of Mandamus is a summary procedure as
distinguished from a plenary action and is unavailable to the Respondents. It should also be noted that
the Respondents, before invoking the extraordinary
and peremptory Writ of Mandamus in this proceeding, have neither alleged nor offered at the hearing
on the petition, one iota of evidence to the effect that
they have no plain and adequate remedy at law. This
allegation and proof to sustain it are indispensible
prerequisites to the issuance of the Writ under any
circumstance, and the Writ cannot be made to serve
the purpose of a writ of error, an appeal, or an order
of certiorari. (Vol. 3, Rathkopf-Law of Zoning and
Planning, Ch. 68, Sect. 4)
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
which is available only in cases in which the
usual forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief." (52 Am. Jur. 2nd 334, Section 5)
(See also 52 Am. Jur. 2nd 337, Section 9; 52 Am.
Jur. 2nd 356; Section 31; Rathkopf-Law of
Zoning and Planning, Vol. 3, Ch. 68, Sect. 1(2).)
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE APPELLANTS TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT
THE PERMIT SHOULD BE GRANTED:
Contrary to the oral expression of the trial court,
it is respectfully submitted that although the burden
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of going forward with the evidence may change from
time to time in the progress of a case, when the Respondents applied for a writ of mandamus, the burden of proving their entitlement thereto rested upon
them and all presumptions were and are against
them in favor of the Appellants.
"The rule that the burden of proof rests
upon the party who asserts the affirmative of
an issue applies in mandamus proceedings.
Thus, the burden is upon the applicant to show
that his right to the issuance of the writ is
clear and indisputable and, except as to allegations that are admitted by the answer or otherwise, he must prove every fact that is the foundation of his proceeding. He must show an enforceable right; an imperative duty of the Respondent to perform; the authority, ability,
and means of the Respondent; the lack of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy; the
performance or compliance with necessary conditions precedent, including, where necessary, a
demand for performance and refusal thereof;
and, if the duty in question is discretionary,
that there was an arbitrary exercise or abuse
of discretion ... " (52 Am. Jur. 2nd 786, Section
466)

The courts of this state have adopted the fore·
going principles (See MORRISON vs. HORNE, 12
Utah 2nd 131; 363 Pac. 2nd 1113)
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"Plaintiffs, in an action to review the action of county commissioners denying an application for permit to construct and operate mobile homes park, had burden of establishing
their cause of action by preponderance of evidence, and it was incumbent upon them to show
unreasonableness of such action. The court, in
action to review county commissioners' denial
of permit, may not substitute its judgment for
that of the commissioners', and should not declare the action of the commissioners unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the
evidence in light of presumption that the commissioners acted reasonably." (CRETEN vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY, 204 Kansas
782; 466 Pac. 2nd 263; COE vs. ALBUQUERQUE, 76 N. M. 77; 48 Pac. 2nd 545)
"Presumption of validity exists in favor of
Board of Adjustment's determination and one
who attacks such determination is met with the
presumption and carries the burden of showing the decision to be against the weight of the
evidence, unreasonable, erroneous, or illegal as
a matter of law." (MUELLER vs. CITY OF
PHOENIX, ex rel. PHOENIX BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT, 102 Arizona 575; 435 Pac.
2nd 472)
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CON.'
SIDER AND TO GRANT APPELLANTS' APPL!.
CATION FOR AN INJUNCTION AND RE.
STRAINING ORDER AGAINST THE RESPOND.
ENTS:
Because the Respondents have proceeded to
remodel and convert a "single-family" dwelling in
the A-2 Zone of Mapleton City to a "multi-family,"
multi-person, foster-family care home or center and
to occupy the same in violation of the applicable ordinances of Mapleton City and without having pro·
cured the necessary permits therefor, the trial court
should have enjoined and restrained them from fur-.
ther remodeling or occupying the same, and their.
use and occupancy of the same should be abated pur- .
suant to the provisions of Title 10-9-16 and 10-9-30,.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The Respondents should i
have been further enjoined from conducting any business or use in or about said premises as a dormitory,
rooming house, boarding house, foster-family care
home, or detention facility of any kind, nature, or
description, or as a pretended school, and from otherwise perpetrating, committing, or permitting any
illegal act, conduct, business, or use in or about said
premises, all as demanded in the counterclaim of
Mapleton City againt the Respondents. This action
did not require the court to make any determination
as to the purpose of the facility. On the contrary, to
1

1
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grant the Appellants' application for an injunction against the Respondents, the court needed only
to consider these basic facts:
(1) That the Respondents have proceeded to build
or remodel a structure and
(2)) To occupy the same, without having first
procured a building permit and certificate of compliance all in direct violation of Sections 8-2 and 8-7
of the Zoning Ordinances of Mapleton City, which
require that the applicant for a building permit procure the same before constructing, altering, reconstructing, or moving any building or changing the
use of any land and a certificate of compliance before
using or occupying the same.
It is not necessary to deny that facilities of the
type proposed by the Respondents may serve a useful
purpose or be desirable. The fact is that the facility
proposed is violative of the Zoning Ordinance of
Mapleton City, and is appropriate only to the R-3
Zone. Whether or not there is presently land zoned
in the R-3 classification is of no moment in view of
the decision of this court in CHEVRON OIL COMP ANY vs. BEAVER COMPANY, 22 Utah 2nd 143,
449 Pac. 2nd 989, where the court held that the fact
that an ordinance provided for highway service
zones, but that no land had been zoned for that use
was not a fatal defect. The Respondents are free to
take anpronriate action to have land included in the
R-3 Zone by established nrocedures.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the facts and authority set out
herein, Appellants respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the
writ of mandamus quashed. Appellants further submit that the trial court should be ordered and required, pursuant to the Title 10-9-16 and 10-9-30,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to issue an injunction
and restraining order against the Respondents
in accord with the demand of the counterclaim of the
Appellants.
Respectfully submitted
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NEDSON
By V. Pershing Nelson
43 East 200 North, Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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